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FOREWORD: COMPENSATED SURROGACY IN THE
AGE OF WINDSOR
Kellye Y. Testy
Having my baby, what a lovely way of saying how much you
love me; Having my baby, what a lovely way of saying what
you're thinking of me .....
When Paul Anka sang those chart-topping words in 1974, the first
sperm bank had recently opened in New York City,2 and it would still be
four years before Louise Brown, the first "test-tube" baby, was born in
England3 and yet another eight years before the now-famous Baby M
was born.4 In celebrating his wife's traditional pregnancy, Anka's song
achieved a rare coup-topping both the Billboard Hot 100 and many
lists of the worst songs ever. The song made people of many different
viewpoints commonly uncomfortable. Feminists and other liberal
thinkers criticized it as misogynistically claiming male dominance
("my," not "our" baby) and seeming to value women only for their
capacity to reproduce.6 At the same time, religious and conservative
thinkers took exception to its cavalier approach to abortion ("[d]idn't
have to keep it . . [y]ou could have swept it from your life").
The song's controversy has not abated with time; rather, it continues
Dean, University of Washington School of Law.
1. PAUL ANKA, (YOU'RE) HAVING MY BABY (Capitol Records 1974).
2. Ellen Frankfort, Deposits & Withdrawals. The Finances of Sperm, VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 29,
1971), available at http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/201 1/01/new yorks-first.php.
3. The World's First Test Tube Baby, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/
features/general-article/babies-worlds-first/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2014).
4. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), aff'g in part rev'g in part, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
5. Chaz Kangas, Paul Anka's "Having My Baby". Disgustingly Misogynist or Unfairly
Maligned?, VILLAGE VOICE (May 24, 2013), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/music/2013/05/
paul anka having my baby.php.
6. Id.
7. Id. (quoting PAUL ANKA, supra note 1).
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to stir debate.' The raw and lasting nerves the song has touched are not
unlike those set on edge by the topic of surrogacy, especially
compensated surrogacy.9 The surrogacy debate begins with the issues of
sex, gender, reproduction, children-already individually and
intersectionally heavily laden with cultural contest-and adds issues of
money and commerce. Compounding matters further, add the twenty-
first century issues of fast-paced technological innovation and
increasingly global markets that are affecting every area of life. There is
no easy place to stand amid such a turbulent swirl.
Like Anka's song, compensated surrogacy also makes people of many
different political and ideological persuasions commonly uncomfortable.
For example, many feminist, critical race, and social justice theorists
continue to raise concerns that compensated surrogacy subjugates
women, especially women of color and poor women. o At the same time,
progressives are uncomfortable restricting the liberty of a woman to
choose how to use her own body" or insisting that her labor be done
only as charity. 12 Likewise, few progressives are comfortable restricting
the availability of surrogacy when it is well known that it often supports
the formation of nontraditional families, such as parenting by gay men.13
Surrogacy's disruption of the heteronormativity and essentialism of
traditional parenting roles cannot be underestimated, although it
reinforces a pervasive norm of genetic connection as most desirable for a
parent-child relationship. Were the genetic connection to a child less
privileged, adoption would be a readily available substitute for surrogacy
for those persons wishing to parent but not willing or able to birth a
child. 14
Progressive thinkers are not the only ones searching for a foot-hold on
this difficult issue. Ordinarily, conservative thinkers would be strong
supporters of markets and little concerned with the commodification of
8. Id.
9. Surrogacy can be altruistic or commercial, although this distinction is less sharp when altruistic
surrogates are paid their "reasonable and necessary" expenses. Some of those expenses can start to
look very much like compensation.
10. Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of Gestational Surrogacy
Contracts, 18 CARDozo J.L. & GENDER 391, 404, 405, 407 (2012).
11. Id. at 406.
12. Id.
13. Mark Hansen, As Surrogacy Becomes More Popular, Legal Problems Proliferate, ABA J.
(Mar. 1, 2011, 5:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/as-surrogacy becomes
more popular legal problems proliferate.
14. For a good example of adoption's wide availability and access, see THE DONALDSON
ADOPTION INST., http://adoptioninstitute.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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labor. 5 To push the issue, what, for instance, is worse about paying a
woman to have a child than paying a woman for sex work or to work in
sweat-shop conditions sewing athletic wear? But for conservatives and
other thinkers who want to draw a clear line against "selling babies," is
compensated surrogacy really all that far away? While surrogacy
supporters are careful to distinguish surrogacy from "selling babies,"16
it is difficult to argue that the intended parents are paying for anything
other than a baby. The benefit of the bargain is getting a baby and the
only exchange that will complete the contract to the intended parents'
satisfaction.
The examples above are but the tip of the iceberg in exploring the
challenging and interesting questions of law, ethics, and policy raised by
compensated surrogacy. Those questions are further complicated by
wide variation among individual states' approaches to the regulation of
compensated surrogacy. The authors in this timely symposium tackle
the many and varied issues related to compensated surrogacy with
sophisticated, diverse, and careful analysis. Moreover, they do so in the
context of fast-paced legal and sociological change on issues of marriage
and parenting, some of which was crystalized in the recent United States
v. Windsor" decision that spurred growing recognition of gay marriage
and families across the nation.
Noting that compensated surrogacy has "implications for every area
of feminist concern,"19 Ms. Sarah Ainsworth's helpful contribution to
the symposium details the process she and others went through to
develop a feminist framework for addressing surrogacy.20 MS.
Ainsworth notes that feminist viewpoints were largely missing when
Washington State banned compensated surrogacy in 1989,21 and did not
15. See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71
(1990); Rebuplican Platform: Restoring the American Dream: Economy & Jobs, GOP.CoM
https://www.gop.com/platform/restoring-the-american-dream/.
16. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy, 21 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 132, 133, 148-49 (1992) ("tentatively" arguing that "commercial surrogacy should be legally
permissible" and clarifying that creating a market for surrogacy and adoption services is not "baby-
selling").
17. Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A Constitutional Law Professor's Musings on
Circumventing Washington State's Criminal Prohibition on Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L.
REv. 1235, 1239-45 (2014).
18. U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
19. Sara L. Ainsworth, Bearing Children, Bearing Risks: Feminist Leadership for Progressive
Regulation of Compensated Surrogacy in the United States, 89 WASH. L. REv. 1077, 1078 (2014).
20. Id. at 1079-80.
21. Id. at 1078 79.
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enter the debate until a gay male legislator-and father of three children
born to a surrogate mother-proposed lifting the ban in 2010.22 That
effort failed, but it provided Ms. Ainsworth and her then-employer,
Legal Voice, an opportunity to develop a thoughtful approach to the
issue. Ms. Ainsworth cogently explains the framework Legal Voice
adopted after two years of community engagement and careful study,
one based on anti-essentialist analysis and pragmatic feminism. She
also urges feminist advocates toward greater leadership in surrogacy
regulation and to seek reproductive justice in the growing field of
assisted reproduction.24
Professor Khiara M. Bridges tackles the effects of the Windsor
decision on parenting, asking whether critical race theorists opposing
surrogacy should reconsider their concerns in light of social and legal
progress for gay and lesbian families who are often the beneficiaries of
25
surrogacy contracts. She notes that the Justices in Windsor expressed
strong concern for the welfare of the children of same-sex marriage,
which begs the question of how those children will come to be.26 To the
degree she sees Windsor as legitimating the children of same-sex
couples, she asserts that it likewise de-legitimates laws that frustrate the
formation of same-sex families. Her essay focuses on laws that prohibit
the enforceability of surrogacy contracts, and she provides insight into
27the probable racial effects of compensated surrogacy.
While being clear that white people are the primary consumers of
advanced reproductive technologies, including surrogacy, Professor
Bridges also notes that surrogates do not tend to be uneducated, poor, or
racial minorities despite early fears that compensated surrogacy might
lead to a breeder class of those women.28 For Professor Bridges, this is
cool relief, and in her view creates a "catch-22" in which the non-
commissioning of women of color as surrogates may be at least as
problematic.29 While understanding concerns that compensated
surrogacy may contribute to racial hierarchies, Professor Bridges does
not think surrogacy bans are the answer. Rather she calls for a more
transformational social justice project that supports a wide range of
22. Id. at 1079.
23. Id. at 1104-12.
24. Id. at 1123.
25. Khiara M. Bridges, Windsor, Surrogacy, and Race, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2014).
26. Id. at 1128 30.
27. Id. at 1152 53.
28. Id. at 1139-41.
29. Id. at 1140.
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families, one that creates richer and more accurate accounts of "good"
families and that provides legal and social support for those families.30
Professor Martha Field, who wrote the influential 1988 book,
Surrogate Motherhood, revisits her original analysis in light of the vast
changes in technology and family recognition that have taken place in
the interim.31 Professor Field argues that Windsor does not and should
not change the constitutional and federal landscape for compensated
surrogacy. Rather, she argues that surrogacy laws and regulation will
and should continue to evolve state-by-state.32 As the evolution
proceeds, Professor Field continues to sound cautionary notes about the
vulnerability of surrogates, especially in countries where the rule of law
and women's equality is weaker than in the United States.33 That is not
to say that she advocates banning surrogacy, as she rightly understands
that surrogacy will not stop; rather, it will take place in either a regulated
or a black market.34 Further, unlike Professor Nicolas, she does not
believe the law is likely to evolve toward providing any constitutional
35
protections for a right to surrogacy.
Dean Anthony Infanti continues his exploration of the many ways that
the federal taxation system exhibits a preference for heterosexual
marriage and parenting.36 Using the 2013 Windsor decision that the
Defense of Marriage Act's differential treatment of same-sex marriage
for federal taxation regulations was unconstitutional as his point of
departure, Dean Infanti details the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS)
responsive guidance to same-sex couples. Although the IRS's response
was broad and enthusiastic in seeking to put same-sex marriages on
equal tax footing, Dean Infanti asserts that the regulations continue to be
strongly heteronormative in their effects.3
Dean Infanti then goes on to explore how that bias affects federal tax
incentives for procreation as they apply to compensated surrogacy, often
the only practical option for gay couples wishing to have children. He
30. Id. at 1152 53.
31. See MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988); Martha A. Field, Compensated
Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1155 (2014)
32. Field, supra note 31, at 1176 77.
33. Id. at 1174 76.
34. Id. at 1181-82.
35. Id. at 1177-81.
36. Anthony C. Infanti, The House of Windsor: Accentuating the Heteronormativity in the Tax
Incentives for Procreation, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1184-87 (2014).
37. Id. at 1210-26; see also Lily Kahng, The Not-So-Merry Wives of Windsor (work in progress)
(draft on file with author) (arguing that Windsor's effects on married same-sex female couples may
be disadvantageous in many circumstances).
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explores the primary tax incentives for family formation, including the
deduction for medical expenses, the adoption credit, and the exclusion
for employer-provided adoption assistance.38 Providing an in-depth
analysis of the operation of Section 213, Dean Infanti concludes that
surrogacy-related expenses will not receive favorable tax treatment for
many same-sex couples wishing to procreate.3 9 Dean Infanti understands
these exclusions as further reinforcing the medicalization of procreation
in our tax laws and its continued bias in favor of heterosexual families.40
Professor Peter Nicolas makes a unique and insightful contribution to
the literature on compensated surrogacy by first narrating his own
experience of compensated surrogacy when he and his partner
contracted with a surrogate mother to gestate their child.41 Professor
Nicolas' personal experience strongly reinforces both the complexity of
navigating the current regulatory landscape and the proposition that the
relationship between the surrogate mother and the intended parents is of
critical importance for the success of the transaction. As a gay man,
Professor Nicolas supports opportunities that compensated surrogacy
provides to those couples unable or unwilling to conceive a child
42through their sexual relationship. As a constitutional scholar, he also
argues forcefully that denying such opportunities to form a family may
violate fundamental due process or equal protection rights to procreate
and to have care and custody of one's children that our Constitution has
recognized.43
Mr. Terry Price explores in depth the Baby M44 case that first brought
surrogacy to the public's attention in 1986, Washington State's 1989
decision to ban compensated surrogacy, and its subsequent 2011
flirtation with changing that prohibition.45 Mr. Price, an astute legislative
analyst, provides a rich description of Washington State's legislative
history on surrogacy and explains why the state continues to make
46
surrogacy a criminal act. Noting that technology is outpacing legal
reform on this issue, and that it has been almost a decade since other
38. Infanti, supra note 36, at 1215 20.
39. Id. at 1227-28.
40. Id.
41. Nicolas, supra note 17, at 1237-67.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1279-1309.
44. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
45. Terry Price, The Future of Compensated Surrogacy in Washington State: Anytime Soon?, 89
WASH. L. REV. 1311, 1312-16 (2014).
46. Id at 1318-43.
1074 [Vol. 89:1169
FOREWORD
states have resolved the legal status of intended parents, Price is
nonetheless not optimistic that Washington State will change its laws
anytime soon.4 Washingtonians, like Nicolas, will have to continue to
travel to neighboring states in order to benefit from their less hostile and
more reliable regulatory approaches to surrogacy.
Finally, Professor Julie Shapiro, with her characteristically astute
insight into the questions that really matter, argues that laws regulating
compensated surrogacy should not distinguish between traditional (egg
is provided by the surrogate) and gestational (egg is provided by a
48
second woman) surrogacy. Professor Shapiro generally supports
compensated surrogacy, and so seeks to make it available to a wider
group of people and to protect the surrogate from ill effects of power
imbalances.49 With this goal, she is rightly concerned that the higher cost
of gestational surrogacy reserves it for those of significant means and
also creates an even more asymmetrical power imbalance between the
surrogate and the wealthy intended parents. Drawing on the growing
body of important empirical analysis of surrogacy,so Professor Shapiro
also notes that the traditional surrogates' genetic connection to the child
has not resulted in more custody disputes.i Rather, as Shapiro and
Nicolas both point out, the strongest determinants of successful
surrogacy are the prior screening and counseling of the surrogate and the
development of a positive relationship between the surrogate and the
52intended parents. As Anka sang, the surrogate's contractual
performance may indeed be "a lovely way of saying what she's thinking
of' the intended parents.
Professor Shapiro also makes a second and more controversial
argument: that the surrogate should be recognized by law as a legal
parent.53 Noting that this is the legal structure for surrogacy in the
United Kingdom, and that it has worked well, Professor Shapiro sees
this change as having at least two key advantages. 54 One is that it
reinforces her progressive vision of parenting as not being limited to just
47. Id. at 1336-43.
48. Julie Shapiro, For a Feminist Considering Surrogacy, Is Compensation Really the Key
Question?, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1345, 1347-63 (2014).
49. See generally id.
50. Id. at 1362.
51. Id. at 1360-63.
52. See Nicolas, supra note 17, at 1248, 1249-55, 1297; Shapiro, supra note 48, at 1366.
53. Shapiro, supra note 48, at 1365-66.
54. Id- at 1365.
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one mom and one dad. The second is that it accords a more appropriate
recognition of the surrogate's status and increases her power vis-a-vis
the intended parents in what is otherwise an often asymmetrical
bargaining posture.s Professor Shapiro's position on this issue matches
the one Professor Field advanced in her well-regarded 1988 book, and
that she reinforces in her contribution to this symposium.s5
The symposium's authors have provided us with an outstanding
assessment of the current state of compensated surrogacy. As with much
social change, initial fears about compensated surrogacy seem to have
been overstated if compared to the past two decades of experience. That
said, the continued pace of technological change, globalization, and
wealth inequality together require that we remain vigilant in analyzing
how the next decade of experience will unfold. Moreover, just as we
have seen with the continuing divergence of public opinion about Paul
Anka's song, the public will continue to be highly invested in concern
about who's having (or trying to have) babies with whom. As a result,
the next stages of legal and policy development around reproductive
issues are sure to continue to be contested and complex.
55. Id. at 1368-69.
56. Id. at 1367-68.
57. See FIELD, supra note 31; Field, supra note 31.
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